There is increasing evidence to suggest that adaptation to the inevitable is as relevant to climate change policymaking as mitigation efforts.
Both mitigation and adaptation, as well as the unavoidable damage occurring both now and that is predicted to occur, all involve costs at the expense of diverse climate change victims. The allocation of responsibilities—implicit in terms of the burden-sharing mechanisms that currently exist in public and private governance—demands recourse under liability law, especially as it has become clear that most companies will only start reducing emissions if verifiable costs of the economic consequences of climate change, including the likelihood of liability, outweigh the costs of taking precautionary measures.
This vitally important book asks: Can the precautionary principle make uncertainty judiciable in the context of liability for the consequences of climate change, and, if so, to what extent? Drawing on the full range of pertinent existing literature and case law, the author examines the precautionary principle both in terms of its content and application and in the context of liability law. She analyses the indirect means offered by existing legislation being used by environmental groups and affected individuals before the courts to challenge both companies and regulators as responsible agents of climate change damage.