Wildy Logo
(020) 7242 5778
enquiries@wildy.com

Book of the Month

Cover of Derham on the Law of Set Off

Derham on the Law of Set Off

Price: £350.00

Lord Denning: Life, Law and Legacy



  


Welcome to Wildys

Watch


NEW EDITION
The Law of Rights of Light 2nd ed



 Jonathan Karas


Offers for Newly Called Barristers & Students

Special Discounts for Newly Called & Students

Read More ...


Secondhand & Out of Print

Browse Secondhand Online

Read More...


Christmas and New Year Closing

We are now closed for the Christmas and New Year period, reopening on Friday 3rd January 2025. Orders placed during this time will be processed upon our return on 3rd January.

Hide this message

Designing International Environmental Agreements

Carsten SchmidtUniversity of Konztanz, Germany

ISBN13: 9781840643527
ISBN: 1840643528
Published: September 2000
Publisher: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
Format: Hardback
Price: £103.00



The international character of today's most pressing environmental problems has become a key challenge for environmental policy-making. This study combines two core dimensions of international environmental policy: the traditional search for cost-effective policy instruments and the creation of incentives for voluntary co-operation among sovereign nations. The analysis offers some policy recommendations for the design of environmental treaties and for the further development of existing international institutions to protect the global environment.

Contents:
International environmental problems: natural scientific framework; the history of global environmental policy; theoretical framework. Cost-effectiveness: the concept of cost-effectiveness; cost-effectiveness when countries differ in size; empirical relevance in case of carbon emissions; cost-effective policy instruments. Incentive compatibility: the choice of the internalization instrument; internal stabilization; external stabilization; unilateral measures; flexibility and framework provisions; conclusions. Enforcement and side payments: the model; an enforceable agreement with side payments; the case of three countries; conclusions. Financing incremental abatement costs under asymmetric information: agreements under perfect information; signalling incentives; transfers in the separating equilibrium; transfers in the pooling equilibrium; conclusions. Institutions for the global environment: the global environment facility; the Montreal Protocol Unilateral Fund; joint implementation. Summary and outlook: the scope and results of the study; future directions in international environmental policy.