Short-Termism and Shareholder Engagement: Addressing Agency Costs through Monitoring and Corporate Litigation

This book brings together an exceptional group of scholars to discuss a series of most topical issues in the field of comparative corporate law, including short-termism, boards and fiduciary duties, agency costs and corporate litigation.

In Part I, the book provides an account of the rise in institutional investor participation strategies. In Part II, the focus of the book then shifts to consider the fiduciary regime and its legal process rules that provide lawyers with financial incentives to enforce fiduciary norms that address the shareholders’ collective action problem. Moreover, it explores key fiduciary law issues, particularly in the M&A context, from a comparative law standpoint that not only provides the reader with the perspective necessary to understanding US (Delaware) corporate law, but also offers the opportunity to become familiar with the features of company law in England, the Netherlands, and Germany. In Part III, the book looks to how corporate law litigation also serves to address managerial agency costs.