The war fought in June 1967 between Israel and Arab states was widely perceived as being forced on Israel to prevent the annihilation of its people by Arab armies hovering on Israel's borders. Period documents declassified by key governments now give reason to question this view of the war. The United Kingdom, USSR, France, and the United States all knew that the Arab states were not in attack mode and tried feverishly to dissuade Israel from attacking. In later years, the June 1967 war was held up as a precedent allowing an attack on a state that is expected to attack. The precedent has been used to justify even a preemptive assault on a state whose own expected attack is well in the future. The June 1967 war in fact can serve as no precedent in such circumstances, because evidence is lacking that it was waged on Israel's side in anticipation of an attack by Arab states. This book seeks to provide a corrective on the character of the June 1967 war.