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Changing the Rules: Constitutional Amendments in Democracies


ISBN13: 9781009597258
To be Published: May 2025
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Country of Publication: UK
Format: Paperback
Price: £26.99



Changing the Rules enters into the debate between theoretical analyses of constitutional amendments (considered the most important part of a constitution) and empirical research (which argues that amendment provisions have little or no significance). George Tsebelis demonstrates how strict provisions are a necessary condition for amendments to have low frequency and significance and provides empirical evidence from case studies and over 100 democracies to corroborate this claim. Examining various cultural theories that dispute these findings, Tsebelis explains why their conclusions have weak foundations. He argues that constitutional rigidity is also a necessary condition for judicial independence and provides theoretical argument and empirical evidence. Tsebelis also establishes a negative correlation between the length of a constitution and problematic indicators such as time inconsistency, low GDP/capita, high corruption, inequality, and lack of innovation.

This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

Subjects:
Constitutional and Administrative Law, Comparative Law
Contents:
Foreword
Introduction
1. The landscape of constitutional amendments
2. An institutional approach to constitutional rigidity
3. Cultural theories of constitutional amendments
4. Cases of failed amendments: Italy and Chile
5. A case of successful amendments: Mexico
6. Constitutional rigidity and amendment rate
7. Time inconsistency and other correlates of constitutional length
8. Constitutional rigidity and judicial independence
Conclusions