This is an analysis of the theory and practice of impeachment since the Watergate era. Litigation in the intervening period over the Senate's removal of three judges has raised doubta about Congress's interest in and capacity for conducting efficient, fair impeachment proceedings, as well as about whether congressional judgements regarding the impeachability of federal judges are shielded from review by other branches. The book argues that impeachment is a far more effective process then commonly supposed and that it constitutes a special non-reviewable power confined solely to Congress for punishing certain executive and judicial misconduct.;Without ignoring the implications of such a view for future rulings in separation of powers disputes, the author seeks primarily to establish impeachment's uniqueness by conveying a sense of its consitutional, historical and political dimensions. In particular, he provides in Part I a comprehensive historical analysis of the impeachment process. In Part II he traces the practical problems and most troubling administrative difficulties in actual impeachment proceedings conducted by the House of Representatives and the Senate. Part III resolves the most significant constitutional issues recurring in the federal impeachment process, and Part IV examines proposed constitutional amendments and statutory proposals for reforming the federal impeachment process.