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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement


ISBN13: 9780195372656
Published: March 2011
Publisher: Oxford University Press USA
Country of Publication: USA
Format: Hardback
Price: £105.00



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The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.

It addresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement.

It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.

Subjects:
Competition Law, Other Jurisdictions , USA
Contents:
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions
Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation
Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement
Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash
Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy
Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance
Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration
Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury
Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement
Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption
Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement
Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives
Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different?
Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World
Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions?
Index.