Political boundaries are often porous to finance, financial intermediation, and financial distress. Yet they are highly impervious to financial regulation. When inhabitants of a country suffering a deficit of purchasing power can access funds flowing in from a country with a surfeit of such power, both countries may benefit. Inevitably, however, at least some such institutions will sometimes act imprudently, some deployment of funds may be unwise. As a result, a financial institution may suffer distress in one country and transmit such financial distress to other countries in which it operates. This situation creates a conundrum for policymakers and regulators who wish to enable those subject to their jurisdiction to access the benefits of cross-border financial intermediation, yet cannot make rules and regulations that would have effect outside that jurisdiction.
Financial Institutions in Distress explores this conundrum and offers a response. The book opens by examining existing hard and soft laws and regulations, a large body of empirical data collected from regulators from both the Global North and South, which leads to the development of a normative methodology. This is developed in the advocation for the creation of a model law that would address the full range of financial institutions, which would enable relevant authorities to cooperate with counterparts in advance of the onset of distress. This would also apply to measures taken by counterpart authorities in other jurisdictions in which the distressed institution also operates.
.jpg?1680780797)
