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Encounters between criminal-law scholars and those working in 'explanatory' and 'behavioural' sciences have often been characterized by mutual distrust and defensiveness. This distrust is especially intense in connection with the theory and practice of criminal responsibility. To break this deadlock, a new framing of the issues is needed. This is not simply a matter of asking, for example, what follows for criminal responsibility (and responsibility more generally) from the latest scientific findings in neuroscience. Research and conferences on neuroscience and the law abound. Rather, what is needed is to re-examine the fundamental idea of the criminal law's person so as to construct a more nuanced understanding of criminal law's blameworthy individual. That is the goal of this volume. Achieving this goal is necessarily an interdisciplinary task and the volume brings together an international group of academics from across the fields of law, philosophy, and ethics to engage with these topics.